The Twentieth Century
As we've seen there has been a recurring debate between rationalism and empiricism throughout the history of philosophy. The twentieth century has seen a resurgence of rationalism but not before the empiricism of logical positivism had its say. This twentieth-century version of empiricism was in direct reaction to the Hegelian metaphysical system of absolute idealism we addressed earlier. As we discussed then, Hegel believed that the world was "a manifestation of absolute spirit." The reaction of the positivists was, to say the least, puzzled confusion.
Positivism was inspired, in part, by David Hume's empiricism. In particular, one comment from his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding motivated their zeal:
"When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume, of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask 'Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?' No. 'Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?' No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." Now, the positivists never actually burned books but they were in favor of the elimination of metaphysics. This was the title of chapter one of the more influential positivist books: A.J. Ayer's Language Truth and Logic.
As Ayer's title suggests, the main problem with metaphysics is its use of language. To see the problem let's consider Hegel's claim again. This time look at it to find evidence to either confirm or disconfirm it. "The world is a manifestation of absolute spirit." Now, how might we design an experiment to prove or disprove this? That's the problem. It seems impossible to even think of what would count as a test of this. There seems to be no way to verify this proposition. However, according to the positivists, for propositions to be meaningful, they have to be empirically verifiable. Either that or they have to be analytic. This was called the verification theory of meaning. By this criterion metaphysical statements are meaningless. It’s not that metaphysical statements are false. Statements that have meaning can be judged true or false. For example, the moon is made of green cheese. This statement is false but meaningful because it is possible to understand what would verify it. On the other hand, meaningless statements cannot be either true or false. So what use can these statements have if they convey no meaning? Given their meaninglessness they should be eliminated from philosophy entirely.
This raises the obvious question. If philosophy should not be doing metaphysics, what should it be doing? Being centered in Vienna, the positivists, quite naturally, sought their answer to this question in a work by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein with the esoteric title Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The irony of this was that Wittgenstein was never fully on board with the positivist program. In fact, within a couple of decades, Wittgenstein was to entirely repudiate his philosophy of the Tractatus! Still, at the time of publication in 1921, it was a godsend to the verificationists. According to Wittgenstein, philosophy should set the limits for what can and cannot be said. In particular, philosophy should address the logical rules of language thus freeing the scientists to make empirical progress. From Wittgenstein's perspective, everything that can be said in philosophy had been said in the seven propositions of the Tractatus. The result of this was succinctly expressed in the final sentence: What we cannot speak of we must pass over in silence. As for the rest of Wittgenstein's philosophy, we'll address that later.
Another variation on the verification theory was offered by the philosopher of science Karl Popper. Interestingly Popper had a famous run-in with Wittgenstein where, by some accounts, he was attacked by Wittgenstein with a fireplace poker! The details of this strange story have always been in some dispute and have recently been chronicled by David Edmonds and John Eidinow. The dispute was over whether there were real problems in philosophy (Popper) or whether there were just certain puzzles to resolve (Wittgenstein). One of the problems Popper was no doubt thinking of was the problem with verification.
From the very beginning, there was always a question as to what exactly constituted verification of a proposition. Take, for example, the proposition "All swans are white." We can imagine what it might take to verify this. Simply observe all swans. However, a moment's reflection reveals that this is not as simple as it sounds. If I could observe every swan now living would that verify it? Not really because it doesn't take into account any future swans that may or may not be white. The simple fact is that the proposition cannot be conclusively verified. The alternative, according to Popper, is to focus on what it would take to falsify a statement. The proposition "All swans are white" can be easily falsified if we simply find one black swan. It turns out that falsification can be a more effective criterion to judge meaning. In an interesting turn of history, Popper's criterion not only eliminates the metaphysics of Hegel on the grounds of its meaninglessness, but it also eliminates Freudian psychoanalysis and Marx's dialectical materialism. See, the problem with both theories, according to Popper, is that they admit of no way of being rendered false. For a theory to be useful it must be falsifiable.
While the positivists were criticizing Hegel's philosophy for being too metaphysical another school of philosophy was reacting against Hegel's emphasis on the abstract and universal at the expense of the individual. The existentialists were also reacting against the over-emphasis on science by the positivists even though the roots of existentialism were, in part, the science-inspired philosophy of phenomenology. Some of the issues involved here are complicated and beyond the scope of a single chapter. However, in brief, phenomenology arose as a result of the perceived separation science was encouraging between human beings and the world we observe. In the pursuit of objectivity, science presupposes that we can make observations and inferences about the world without addressing our position in the world or the perspective we take in observing the world.
So the common theme of both phenomenology and existentialism is an emphasis on the individual and the subjectivity of philosophy. What matters, according to one prominent phenomenologist named Martin Heidegger, is our "situatedness" or what he often referred to as our "being-in-the-world." We don't make observations from an independent perspective rather, we relate to the world in terms of our concerns and projects. We see things in terms of our desires to achieve things, the meaning we give events and objects, and importantly, the relationships we form with others.
Given their emphasis on subjectivity, each of the phenomenologists approached the issues differently. Jean-Paul Sartre addressed the issue of human nature, the responsibility, and freedom we have to make of our lives what we will and famously, the essence of being. As Sartre put it, "nothingness lies coiled at the heart of being like a worm." Like the positivists, the existentialists were concerned about meaning, but not in the verification (or falsification) sense. The existentialists were concerned with the meaning of individual human beings' lives. Because of this, there was great interest in existentialism as a method of therapy. So, even as Popper was criticizing Freudian psychoanalysis, psychiatrists were embracing some of the basic tenets of existentialism. The best example of this is the approach of a holocaust survivor and psychiatrist Viktor Frankl. His logotherapy emphasizes the importance of meaning and how every human life, even one filled with suffering, has meaning.
One of the best examples of the synthesis of these various strands of philosophy was the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. After writing the Tractatus in the early 20s Wittgenstein left philosophy for many years. When he came back to it in the 30s he had radically changed his approach. His philosophy was immensely influential precisely because he was able to combine the important aspects of diverse philosophical schools of thought such as analytic philosophy, with its interest in language, and existential philosophy, with its interest like individual human beings. Wittgenstein also investigated the connection between philosophy and psychology and the foundations of mathematics. And as we will see over the course of the next two chapters, he was able to formulate original perspectives on the recurring questions of metaphysics and epistemology that we have been dealing with throughout the book.
But it’s not only the scope and influence of Wittgenstein's philosophy that warrants our detailed look at him. It’s also his unconventional approach to the subject. He once remarked that a really good work of philosophy could be written that consisted entirely of jokes or questions with no answers. He uses both in his philosophy. As an example of that: "Why can't a dog simulate pain? Is he too honest?" In his memoir on Wittgenstein, Norman Malcolm provides an example of the unique perspective Wittgenstein provides:
"At one of the at-homes, Wittgenstein related a riddle to throw some light on the nature of philosophy. It went as follows: Suppose that a cord was stretched tightly around the earth at the equator. Now suppose that a piece one yard long was added to the cord. If the cord was kept taut and circular in form, how much above the surface of the earth would it be? Without stopping to work it out, everyone present was inclined to say that the distance of the cord from the surface of the earth would be so minute that it would be imperceptible. But that is wrong. The actual distance would be nearly six inches. Wittgenstein declared that this is the kind of mistake that occurs in philosophy. It consists in being misled by a picture."
As we will see when we look at certain philosophical problems from Wittgenstein's perspective, it’s not the incorrectness of the picture that leads to the problem. It’s the wrong conclusions we draw from it. The first problem we will address is the problem of dualism. We will be examining selections from Philosophical Investigations which address one of the central assumptions of dualism and show the flaws inherent in it. Briefly put, dualism implies that only I know what I'm thinking and feeling since the mind is private and hidden from public view. But, if this is true then I should be able to assign words to these thoughts and feelings and refer to them in a language that only I can understand. This, Wittgenstein, refers to as a private language. However, as Wittgenstein argues, the notion of a private language is incoherent.
The second problem we will address is epistemology. We will be examining selections from On Certainty which addresses the problems involved in thinking that knowledge and certainty are connected. The search for certainty in knowledge has led to skepticism and one way to avoid this may be to separate the two concepts. As Wittgenstein points out, the logic of knowledge implies doubt, while the logic of certainty precludes doubt.
As you read Wittgenstein one of the first things you'll notice is that his writing style is unlike anything we've discussed so far. He does not give us a neatly outlined, thoroughly argued philosophical theory. Instead, Wittgenstein presents us with various aphorisms from which we have to piece together and extract meaning. This is not merely an affectation or Wittgenstein's inability to write well. The problems Wittgenstein is dealing with require an examination of how language itself is used. And, as Wittgenstein tells us in the preface to Philosophical Investigations, "I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking." So, let's proceed with that in mind and do some thinking!
Positivism was inspired, in part, by David Hume's empiricism. In particular, one comment from his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding motivated their zeal:
"When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume, of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask 'Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?' No. 'Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?' No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." Now, the positivists never actually burned books but they were in favor of the elimination of metaphysics. This was the title of chapter one of the more influential positivist books: A.J. Ayer's Language Truth and Logic.
As Ayer's title suggests, the main problem with metaphysics is its use of language. To see the problem let's consider Hegel's claim again. This time look at it to find evidence to either confirm or disconfirm it. "The world is a manifestation of absolute spirit." Now, how might we design an experiment to prove or disprove this? That's the problem. It seems impossible to even think of what would count as a test of this. There seems to be no way to verify this proposition. However, according to the positivists, for propositions to be meaningful, they have to be empirically verifiable. Either that or they have to be analytic. This was called the verification theory of meaning. By this criterion metaphysical statements are meaningless. It’s not that metaphysical statements are false. Statements that have meaning can be judged true or false. For example, the moon is made of green cheese. This statement is false but meaningful because it is possible to understand what would verify it. On the other hand, meaningless statements cannot be either true or false. So what use can these statements have if they convey no meaning? Given their meaninglessness they should be eliminated from philosophy entirely.
This raises the obvious question. If philosophy should not be doing metaphysics, what should it be doing? Being centered in Vienna, the positivists, quite naturally, sought their answer to this question in a work by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein with the esoteric title Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The irony of this was that Wittgenstein was never fully on board with the positivist program. In fact, within a couple of decades, Wittgenstein was to entirely repudiate his philosophy of the Tractatus! Still, at the time of publication in 1921, it was a godsend to the verificationists. According to Wittgenstein, philosophy should set the limits for what can and cannot be said. In particular, philosophy should address the logical rules of language thus freeing the scientists to make empirical progress. From Wittgenstein's perspective, everything that can be said in philosophy had been said in the seven propositions of the Tractatus. The result of this was succinctly expressed in the final sentence: What we cannot speak of we must pass over in silence. As for the rest of Wittgenstein's philosophy, we'll address that later.
Another variation on the verification theory was offered by the philosopher of science Karl Popper. Interestingly Popper had a famous run-in with Wittgenstein where, by some accounts, he was attacked by Wittgenstein with a fireplace poker! The details of this strange story have always been in some dispute and have recently been chronicled by David Edmonds and John Eidinow. The dispute was over whether there were real problems in philosophy (Popper) or whether there were just certain puzzles to resolve (Wittgenstein). One of the problems Popper was no doubt thinking of was the problem with verification.
From the very beginning, there was always a question as to what exactly constituted verification of a proposition. Take, for example, the proposition "All swans are white." We can imagine what it might take to verify this. Simply observe all swans. However, a moment's reflection reveals that this is not as simple as it sounds. If I could observe every swan now living would that verify it? Not really because it doesn't take into account any future swans that may or may not be white. The simple fact is that the proposition cannot be conclusively verified. The alternative, according to Popper, is to focus on what it would take to falsify a statement. The proposition "All swans are white" can be easily falsified if we simply find one black swan. It turns out that falsification can be a more effective criterion to judge meaning. In an interesting turn of history, Popper's criterion not only eliminates the metaphysics of Hegel on the grounds of its meaninglessness, but it also eliminates Freudian psychoanalysis and Marx's dialectical materialism. See, the problem with both theories, according to Popper, is that they admit of no way of being rendered false. For a theory to be useful it must be falsifiable.
While the positivists were criticizing Hegel's philosophy for being too metaphysical another school of philosophy was reacting against Hegel's emphasis on the abstract and universal at the expense of the individual. The existentialists were also reacting against the over-emphasis on science by the positivists even though the roots of existentialism were, in part, the science-inspired philosophy of phenomenology. Some of the issues involved here are complicated and beyond the scope of a single chapter. However, in brief, phenomenology arose as a result of the perceived separation science was encouraging between human beings and the world we observe. In the pursuit of objectivity, science presupposes that we can make observations and inferences about the world without addressing our position in the world or the perspective we take in observing the world.
So the common theme of both phenomenology and existentialism is an emphasis on the individual and the subjectivity of philosophy. What matters, according to one prominent phenomenologist named Martin Heidegger, is our "situatedness" or what he often referred to as our "being-in-the-world." We don't make observations from an independent perspective rather, we relate to the world in terms of our concerns and projects. We see things in terms of our desires to achieve things, the meaning we give events and objects, and importantly, the relationships we form with others.
Given their emphasis on subjectivity, each of the phenomenologists approached the issues differently. Jean-Paul Sartre addressed the issue of human nature, the responsibility, and freedom we have to make of our lives what we will and famously, the essence of being. As Sartre put it, "nothingness lies coiled at the heart of being like a worm." Like the positivists, the existentialists were concerned about meaning, but not in the verification (or falsification) sense. The existentialists were concerned with the meaning of individual human beings' lives. Because of this, there was great interest in existentialism as a method of therapy. So, even as Popper was criticizing Freudian psychoanalysis, psychiatrists were embracing some of the basic tenets of existentialism. The best example of this is the approach of a holocaust survivor and psychiatrist Viktor Frankl. His logotherapy emphasizes the importance of meaning and how every human life, even one filled with suffering, has meaning.
One of the best examples of the synthesis of these various strands of philosophy was the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. After writing the Tractatus in the early 20s Wittgenstein left philosophy for many years. When he came back to it in the 30s he had radically changed his approach. His philosophy was immensely influential precisely because he was able to combine the important aspects of diverse philosophical schools of thought such as analytic philosophy, with its interest in language, and existential philosophy, with its interest like individual human beings. Wittgenstein also investigated the connection between philosophy and psychology and the foundations of mathematics. And as we will see over the course of the next two chapters, he was able to formulate original perspectives on the recurring questions of metaphysics and epistemology that we have been dealing with throughout the book.
But it’s not only the scope and influence of Wittgenstein's philosophy that warrants our detailed look at him. It’s also his unconventional approach to the subject. He once remarked that a really good work of philosophy could be written that consisted entirely of jokes or questions with no answers. He uses both in his philosophy. As an example of that: "Why can't a dog simulate pain? Is he too honest?" In his memoir on Wittgenstein, Norman Malcolm provides an example of the unique perspective Wittgenstein provides:
"At one of the at-homes, Wittgenstein related a riddle to throw some light on the nature of philosophy. It went as follows: Suppose that a cord was stretched tightly around the earth at the equator. Now suppose that a piece one yard long was added to the cord. If the cord was kept taut and circular in form, how much above the surface of the earth would it be? Without stopping to work it out, everyone present was inclined to say that the distance of the cord from the surface of the earth would be so minute that it would be imperceptible. But that is wrong. The actual distance would be nearly six inches. Wittgenstein declared that this is the kind of mistake that occurs in philosophy. It consists in being misled by a picture."
As we will see when we look at certain philosophical problems from Wittgenstein's perspective, it’s not the incorrectness of the picture that leads to the problem. It’s the wrong conclusions we draw from it. The first problem we will address is the problem of dualism. We will be examining selections from Philosophical Investigations which address one of the central assumptions of dualism and show the flaws inherent in it. Briefly put, dualism implies that only I know what I'm thinking and feeling since the mind is private and hidden from public view. But, if this is true then I should be able to assign words to these thoughts and feelings and refer to them in a language that only I can understand. This, Wittgenstein, refers to as a private language. However, as Wittgenstein argues, the notion of a private language is incoherent.
The second problem we will address is epistemology. We will be examining selections from On Certainty which addresses the problems involved in thinking that knowledge and certainty are connected. The search for certainty in knowledge has led to skepticism and one way to avoid this may be to separate the two concepts. As Wittgenstein points out, the logic of knowledge implies doubt, while the logic of certainty precludes doubt.
As you read Wittgenstein one of the first things you'll notice is that his writing style is unlike anything we've discussed so far. He does not give us a neatly outlined, thoroughly argued philosophical theory. Instead, Wittgenstein presents us with various aphorisms from which we have to piece together and extract meaning. This is not merely an affectation or Wittgenstein's inability to write well. The problems Wittgenstein is dealing with require an examination of how language itself is used. And, as Wittgenstein tells us in the preface to Philosophical Investigations, "I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking." So, let's proceed with that in mind and do some thinking!