Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations
Before getting to Wittgenstein's main arguments concerning the metaphysical issue of dualism, we need to address some fundamental points about his later views on language. To contrast with the verification approach of the positivists, Wittgenstein uses the metaphor of the language-game throughout the Investigations. This term is meant to illustrate several important points. 1. Language is an activity. Language is not some passive instrument that is used for other purposes or activities. Language itself is an activity or as Wittgenstein puts in at one point: "words are deeds." Consider, for example, making a promise. The act itself is simply saying "I promise."
There are other examples of this as well. In any case, as Wittgenstein says in section 23 of the Investigations: "Here the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life." He then gives examples of the various kinds of uses of language that he has in mind such as praying, thanking, cursing, greeting; and many more. 2. Language is rule-based. The second point of the language-game metaphor is that language is a rule-based activity. This may seem obvious and even unimportant but there are several important implications of this point. First, rules must be agreed to by the users of them, in games or in languages. This agreement is central to the ability to use language. As he says in section 224 "The word 'agreement' and the word 'rule' are related to one another, they are cousins." But this agreement is not necessarily arbitrary or relativistic. Consider:
241. "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?" It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.
We will discuss the concept of "form of life" in our chapter on certainty. The important point at this time is to remember that without this agreement, language ceases to work. And also, our third point is implied by this. 3. Language is a shared activity. To engage in language, we must be able to use it with others. Language is not a private activity and our use of it is, at least in principle, a public affair. So, Wittgenstein has given us a concept of language which is quite different from the positivist concept of language being a descriptive instrument whose value lies in verification. For Wittgenstein, language is a rule-based, shared, activity.
To illustrate this, and the flaw in the verification approach, Wittgenstein suggests that we look at how ordinary language is used in many varied ways. Consider for example exclamations. Can we really understand these uses of language on the model that tells us language serves to name things? In 27, Wittgenstein asks us to "Think of exclamations alone, with their completely different functions.
Water!
Away!
Ow!
Help!
Fine!
No!
Are these uses of language naming anything? If so, what are they naming? Other things are going on in language besides descriptive naming. And that's the point.
OK, you're saying. So what? Language does many different things. What's so interesting about that? Well, one of the very important implications of this view of language is as follows:
"202. And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.
It is not possible to obey a rule privately." For example, if I'm driving down the interstate highway at 80 miles an hour and the police pull me over for speeding, I can't claim that I was following the speed limit rule only doing it privately. As if I were to say, "But Officer, that's how I obey the speed limit 65 rule!" Thinking you're obeying a rule is not the same as really obeying it! Remember that.
Now, let’s move on to metaphysics. Dualism, as we've seen earlier, implies a distinction between two realms of ourselves. There is the mind which is private and hidden from the view of others and there is the body that is public and observable. If this distinction is correct, then it's true to say that "only I know what I'm thinking and feeling." However, if this is true, then I should be able to name those thoughts and feelings using words that only I understand. This would be a private language. Here's how Wittgenstein describes this:
"243. A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it. We could even imagine human-beings who spoke only in monologue; who accompanied their activities by talking to themselves. An explorer who watched them and listened to their talk might succeed in translating their language into ours. (This would enable him to predict these people's actions correctly, for he also hears them making resolutions and decisions.)
But could we imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences- his feelings, moods, and the rest- for his private use?- Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language? But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language."
So, dualism implies a private language. Wittgenstein is essentially going to criticize dualism by criticizing the possibility of a private language. In other words, he will argue that a private language is not possible. If there can be no private language then there must be something wrong with the dualist distinction between mind and body. Let's see what's wrong with the notion of a private language.
We'll begin by considering the claims that "only I know what I'm thinking and feeling." Let's give a very specific example of this as Wittgenstein does in section 246. "Only I know when I'm in pain." That seems reasonable enough. Who could possibly question that? Well, Wittgenstein does! He cites two problems with this claim. First, it’s wrong. Second, it's nonsense!
The claim that "only I know when I'm in pain" is wrong because other people often do know when I'm in pain. Of course, you say, they don't know all the time and that's part of the point. Knowing something does not mean always being right. The concept of knowing implies the possibility of being wrong. Other people may be wrong about me being in pain. I, of course, cannot be wrong about being in pain and that's why Wittgenstein says that this claim is nonsense. "It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean- except perhaps that I am in pain?"
So, the basis of a private language is questionable at best. Remember, a private language is only possible if I'm the only one who has knowledge of my private sensations. But there's another problem as well. To illustrate this let's look at section 258:
"Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end, I associate it with the sign 'S' and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation. I will remark first of all that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. But still, I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition. How? Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation- and so as it were, point to it inwardly. But what is this ceremony for? For that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign. Well, that is done precisely by the concentration of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connection between the sign and the sensation. But 'I impress it on myself' can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in the present case, I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'."
To make this clearer, let's use a specific example. I'm going to keep track of a pain in my left foot and to that end every time I have that pain I'll write an "S" in my diary. In fact, I just had a pain there and I'm now making a mark in my diary: "S." This happens every so often and I make the appropriate mark. Oh, but just then I had a pain in my right hand and so I mark in my diary "S." Did I just make a mistake? You're probably saying, yes, I did. After all, I said the "S" was for a pain in my left foot. But, I say to you I made no mistake! How can that be? Well, who's making the rules in this language? Me. Who's deciding whether the rules are being followed? Me again! So this is what Wittgenstein means when he says "whatever is going to seem right to me is right."
Think about it this way. In the NBA, or any other sport for that matter, why don't we let the players be the referees as well? I mean, they're already on the court. We could save ourselves some money by not hiring additional people to referee. But this would cause problems. You can't have the players who are supposed to follow the rules also judge whether they're following the rules correctly. Or, perhaps a better example would be driving. How come we can't let the police officer also be the judge and jury in a criminal case? Again, they're already there! I hope you see the problems with this. As Wittgenstein says in 265 there has to be "something independent" to justify the correct application of rules. This is true for all rule-based activities, not just language. But, with regard to language, this notion has definite metaphysical implications.
Sections 265-272 provide further illustrations of this notion that we need objective justification when it comes to judging whether rules have been followed correctly. We can no more agree with ourselves that the rules of private language have been followed than we can give ourselves money (PI 268). Or, suppose I'm reading a book and don't know the meaning of a certain word. I don't feel like getting up to find a dictionary so I look up the word in the dictionary in my mind. That won't work either!
So what does this do to the metaphysics of dualism? Clearly, this view is flawed because it implies such strange consequences. For example, "If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word 'pain' means- must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?" He continues in section 293 as follows:
"Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word 'beetle' had a use in these people's language? If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant."
It is important to point out that Wittgenstein is not denying the private realm. He's simply pointing out that this private realm cannot be the origin of the meaning of certain words which designate thoughts and feelings. As he points out in 304, it's not that the sensation is a nothing. "Not at all. It is not a something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tried to force itself on us here." Again, we have been misled by a picture into supposing that something exists that does not necessarily exist in the same way we supposed. Speaking of pictures one of the best analogies for this is in section 297:
"Of course, if water boils in a pot, steam comes out of the pot, and also pictured steam comes out of the pictured pot. But what if one insisted on saying that there must also be something boiling in the picture of the pot?"
So we are not denying the inner process. We are denying that the words get their meanings by referring to this inner process (PI 305, 306). And if I've explained things well, you now see Wittgenstein's point and his aim in philosophy to free us from our restricted concept; to "shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle." You feel a certain freedom and liberation now!
There are other examples of this as well. In any case, as Wittgenstein says in section 23 of the Investigations: "Here the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life." He then gives examples of the various kinds of uses of language that he has in mind such as praying, thanking, cursing, greeting; and many more. 2. Language is rule-based. The second point of the language-game metaphor is that language is a rule-based activity. This may seem obvious and even unimportant but there are several important implications of this point. First, rules must be agreed to by the users of them, in games or in languages. This agreement is central to the ability to use language. As he says in section 224 "The word 'agreement' and the word 'rule' are related to one another, they are cousins." But this agreement is not necessarily arbitrary or relativistic. Consider:
241. "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?" It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.
We will discuss the concept of "form of life" in our chapter on certainty. The important point at this time is to remember that without this agreement, language ceases to work. And also, our third point is implied by this. 3. Language is a shared activity. To engage in language, we must be able to use it with others. Language is not a private activity and our use of it is, at least in principle, a public affair. So, Wittgenstein has given us a concept of language which is quite different from the positivist concept of language being a descriptive instrument whose value lies in verification. For Wittgenstein, language is a rule-based, shared, activity.
To illustrate this, and the flaw in the verification approach, Wittgenstein suggests that we look at how ordinary language is used in many varied ways. Consider for example exclamations. Can we really understand these uses of language on the model that tells us language serves to name things? In 27, Wittgenstein asks us to "Think of exclamations alone, with their completely different functions.
Water!
Away!
Ow!
Help!
Fine!
No!
Are these uses of language naming anything? If so, what are they naming? Other things are going on in language besides descriptive naming. And that's the point.
OK, you're saying. So what? Language does many different things. What's so interesting about that? Well, one of the very important implications of this view of language is as follows:
"202. And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.
It is not possible to obey a rule privately." For example, if I'm driving down the interstate highway at 80 miles an hour and the police pull me over for speeding, I can't claim that I was following the speed limit rule only doing it privately. As if I were to say, "But Officer, that's how I obey the speed limit 65 rule!" Thinking you're obeying a rule is not the same as really obeying it! Remember that.
Now, let’s move on to metaphysics. Dualism, as we've seen earlier, implies a distinction between two realms of ourselves. There is the mind which is private and hidden from the view of others and there is the body that is public and observable. If this distinction is correct, then it's true to say that "only I know what I'm thinking and feeling." However, if this is true, then I should be able to name those thoughts and feelings using words that only I understand. This would be a private language. Here's how Wittgenstein describes this:
"243. A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it. We could even imagine human-beings who spoke only in monologue; who accompanied their activities by talking to themselves. An explorer who watched them and listened to their talk might succeed in translating their language into ours. (This would enable him to predict these people's actions correctly, for he also hears them making resolutions and decisions.)
But could we imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences- his feelings, moods, and the rest- for his private use?- Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language? But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language."
So, dualism implies a private language. Wittgenstein is essentially going to criticize dualism by criticizing the possibility of a private language. In other words, he will argue that a private language is not possible. If there can be no private language then there must be something wrong with the dualist distinction between mind and body. Let's see what's wrong with the notion of a private language.
We'll begin by considering the claims that "only I know what I'm thinking and feeling." Let's give a very specific example of this as Wittgenstein does in section 246. "Only I know when I'm in pain." That seems reasonable enough. Who could possibly question that? Well, Wittgenstein does! He cites two problems with this claim. First, it’s wrong. Second, it's nonsense!
The claim that "only I know when I'm in pain" is wrong because other people often do know when I'm in pain. Of course, you say, they don't know all the time and that's part of the point. Knowing something does not mean always being right. The concept of knowing implies the possibility of being wrong. Other people may be wrong about me being in pain. I, of course, cannot be wrong about being in pain and that's why Wittgenstein says that this claim is nonsense. "It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean- except perhaps that I am in pain?"
So, the basis of a private language is questionable at best. Remember, a private language is only possible if I'm the only one who has knowledge of my private sensations. But there's another problem as well. To illustrate this let's look at section 258:
"Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end, I associate it with the sign 'S' and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation. I will remark first of all that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. But still, I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition. How? Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation- and so as it were, point to it inwardly. But what is this ceremony for? For that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign. Well, that is done precisely by the concentration of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connection between the sign and the sensation. But 'I impress it on myself' can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in the present case, I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'."
To make this clearer, let's use a specific example. I'm going to keep track of a pain in my left foot and to that end every time I have that pain I'll write an "S" in my diary. In fact, I just had a pain there and I'm now making a mark in my diary: "S." This happens every so often and I make the appropriate mark. Oh, but just then I had a pain in my right hand and so I mark in my diary "S." Did I just make a mistake? You're probably saying, yes, I did. After all, I said the "S" was for a pain in my left foot. But, I say to you I made no mistake! How can that be? Well, who's making the rules in this language? Me. Who's deciding whether the rules are being followed? Me again! So this is what Wittgenstein means when he says "whatever is going to seem right to me is right."
Think about it this way. In the NBA, or any other sport for that matter, why don't we let the players be the referees as well? I mean, they're already on the court. We could save ourselves some money by not hiring additional people to referee. But this would cause problems. You can't have the players who are supposed to follow the rules also judge whether they're following the rules correctly. Or, perhaps a better example would be driving. How come we can't let the police officer also be the judge and jury in a criminal case? Again, they're already there! I hope you see the problems with this. As Wittgenstein says in 265 there has to be "something independent" to justify the correct application of rules. This is true for all rule-based activities, not just language. But, with regard to language, this notion has definite metaphysical implications.
Sections 265-272 provide further illustrations of this notion that we need objective justification when it comes to judging whether rules have been followed correctly. We can no more agree with ourselves that the rules of private language have been followed than we can give ourselves money (PI 268). Or, suppose I'm reading a book and don't know the meaning of a certain word. I don't feel like getting up to find a dictionary so I look up the word in the dictionary in my mind. That won't work either!
So what does this do to the metaphysics of dualism? Clearly, this view is flawed because it implies such strange consequences. For example, "If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word 'pain' means- must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?" He continues in section 293 as follows:
"Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word 'beetle' had a use in these people's language? If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant."
It is important to point out that Wittgenstein is not denying the private realm. He's simply pointing out that this private realm cannot be the origin of the meaning of certain words which designate thoughts and feelings. As he points out in 304, it's not that the sensation is a nothing. "Not at all. It is not a something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tried to force itself on us here." Again, we have been misled by a picture into supposing that something exists that does not necessarily exist in the same way we supposed. Speaking of pictures one of the best analogies for this is in section 297:
"Of course, if water boils in a pot, steam comes out of the pot, and also pictured steam comes out of the pictured pot. But what if one insisted on saying that there must also be something boiling in the picture of the pot?"
So we are not denying the inner process. We are denying that the words get their meanings by referring to this inner process (PI 305, 306). And if I've explained things well, you now see Wittgenstein's point and his aim in philosophy to free us from our restricted concept; to "shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle." You feel a certain freedom and liberation now!