Wittgenstein's On Certainty
Before we can address Wittgenstein's ideas, we need to put his epistemology in context. Wittgenstein is specifically addressing a theory offered by a colleague of his named G. E. Moore. Moore was keen to put an end to the skepticism that empiricism creates about our knowledge. To this end, he offers what he calls a common-sense defense of knowledge. There are many things we can know with certainty and these can be listed systematically. Among these things, Moore listed the following:
I know I am a human being.
I know I had parents.
I know the Earth is older than 100 years.
I know I am a man and not a woman.
I know I have two hands.
Not only does Moore know these things, but so do all of us. That's part of his point. Despite empiricist claims to the contrary things like this can be known with certainty. This, of course, seems completely obvious and non-controversial. Who could possibly disagree with our knowing these things? Wittgenstein, that's who!
So what's wrong with the claim that "I know I am a human being?" Well, in Section 4 of On Certainty Wittgenstein explains. "In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation. At most, it might be taken to mean 'I know I have the organs of a human.' (E.g. a brain, which, after all, no one has ever yet seen.) But what about such a proposition as "I know I have a brain'? Can I doubt it? Grounds for doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it. Nevertheless, it is imaginable that my skull should turn out empty when it was operated on."
First, the grammar of the word "know" implies that sentences that deny knowledge of something make as much sense as sentences that claim knowledge. For example, if I say "I know what the capital of California is," that makes perfect sense. So does the claim that "I don't know what the capital of California is." But, although it seems to make sense to say "I know I am a human being," it clearly makes no sense, under normal circumstances (an important qualifier), to say "I don't know I am a human being."
Or consider the seemingly sensical claim that "I know I am a man." Could I really be mistaken about such a thing!? What would a mistake like this imply? It doesn't even make sense.
79. "That I am a man and not a woman can be verified, but if I were to say I was a woman, and then tried to explain the error by saying I hadn't checked the statement, the explanation would not be accepted."
See, the problem is that claims of knowledge imply that you have evidence and that you need to provide evidence. If I were to say "I know all the capitals of all the countries in the entire world," you would probably want me to demonstrate such a claim. I would do so by reciting the world capitals. Your asking for evidence makes sense and my providing the evidence also makes sense. But, what about the claim that "I know I am a man?" Does it make sense for you to ask for proof? Should I be required to provide such proof? Of course not!
As we discussed before, knowledge implies the possibility of being wrong. That was the problem with the claim that "I know I am in pain." Now, Wittgenstein is also making the point that knowledge requires proof, and in such cases providing proof must make sense. Additionally, the possibility of doubt must be present. This is how the grammar of the word "know" works. It’s much different from being certain.
12. For "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs that guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression "I thought I knew".
Knowing does not guarantee certainty. That's why I can't be said to know those things Moore lists. "6. Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not. For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse, a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed."
Let's turn our attention to the issue of doubt and the foundation for knowledge that is certainty. Remember, that Descartes begins his quest for certainty by doubting all that can be doubted. He attempts to doubt everything. Can this really be done? Wittgenstein says no. One cannot doubt everything. Something must be presupposed to be certain for doubt to make any sense. As Wittgenstein puts it "if I want the door to turn the hinges must stay put."
It's not only that doubt presupposes certainty (OC 115). Some things cannot even be doubted. I made the point in discussing Descartes, that he doubted the existence of his own body. Why? Because knowledge of the body comes from sense experience and he was questioning sense experience. At the time, this may have struck you as odd. Rightly so! Can we really doubt we have a body? Or, more specifically, could you doubt you had two hands? Wittgenstein seems to be saying no. Something as fundamental as having two hands cannot be doubted and even if it could you wouldn't be able to assuage the doubt. This is what Wittgenstein means when he says:
250. "My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as anything that I could produce in evidence for it. That is why I am not in a position to take the sight of my hand as evidence for it."
As he puts it elsewhere, the "reasonable man does not have certain doubts." (OC 220) There are certain things that we simply don't doubt. It's part of who we are and how we live our lives. Other people may have such doubts. We don't. As we'll see in a moment, this constitutes an important part of the foundation for our knowledge of Wittgenstein's philosophy.
Like Descartes, Wittgenstein was looking for a foundation for our knowledge. But, the foundation is very different. Descartes began with doubt which then led to knowledge we could be certain about. Wittgenstein reverses this relationship. We first begin with certainty and this is the context in which knowledge and doubting exist. We have to learn that some things are doubted but this comes later. Actually, the process begins with belief. "The schoolboy believes his teachers and his schoolbooks" (OC 263). "The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes after belief (OC 160). We need a context into which knowledge and doubt arise. This context is what Wittgenstein refers to as a "nest of propositions" about which we are certain. This, of course, must be taught (OC 448).
The interesting question is: What is the nature of this foundation? For Descartes, it was a self-evident proposition: "I think, therefore I am." This doesn't seem quite correct to Wittgenstein.
204. "Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game."
Yes, we need a foundation and an end to our questioning. But the end is not like the questioning or the knowledge we gain from the questioning. It is qualitatively different. "At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded." (OC 253) Notice, he does not say that the foundation is not a "well-founded belief." It is not founded at all! This may cause you to think that there is no justification for our certainty; there is no foundation. However, the reality is that the foundation is the context in which we make judgments about true and false. But the context itself is neither true nor false: "If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false." (OC 205)
The "ground" or foundation is our way of acting. He points this out in sections 110 and 204. "It is our acting which lies at the bottom of the language-game." And this acting is "ungrounded."
Perhaps we can dramatically illustrate this with an example. Stand up. No, I'm serious I want you to stand up for a moment and then sit back down. OK, now why didn't you check to see whether you had two feet before you stood up? I'm sure you didn't, but why didn't you? Wittgenstein's answer in section 148 is very telling. "There is no why. I simply don't. This is how I act." And that's all there is to it!
This is a radically different approach to epistemology than we have seen before. The skepticism that has plagued us can be solved if we separate knowledge and certainty. They are different categories and seeing this allows us to avoid the strange implications of empiricism which demands direct sense experience for everything. The absence of this sense of experience means the absence of knowledge. In confronting this, Wittgenstein points out that the basis for our knowledge is not more knowledge. It’s something qualitatively different. This is not merely a semantic point. It drastically reorders our cognitive categories and begins to address the connection between the faculties of belief, knowledge, doubt, and certainty. Further work has proceeded on these issues but the foundation, so to speak, was laid by Wittgenstein's important work in On Certainty. One question which fascinated Wittgenstein, in particular, was religious belief. He once said to a friend "I am not a religious man: but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view." It is to philosophy of religion that we now turn.
I know I am a human being.
I know I had parents.
I know the Earth is older than 100 years.
I know I am a man and not a woman.
I know I have two hands.
Not only does Moore know these things, but so do all of us. That's part of his point. Despite empiricist claims to the contrary things like this can be known with certainty. This, of course, seems completely obvious and non-controversial. Who could possibly disagree with our knowing these things? Wittgenstein, that's who!
So what's wrong with the claim that "I know I am a human being?" Well, in Section 4 of On Certainty Wittgenstein explains. "In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation. At most, it might be taken to mean 'I know I have the organs of a human.' (E.g. a brain, which, after all, no one has ever yet seen.) But what about such a proposition as "I know I have a brain'? Can I doubt it? Grounds for doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it. Nevertheless, it is imaginable that my skull should turn out empty when it was operated on."
First, the grammar of the word "know" implies that sentences that deny knowledge of something make as much sense as sentences that claim knowledge. For example, if I say "I know what the capital of California is," that makes perfect sense. So does the claim that "I don't know what the capital of California is." But, although it seems to make sense to say "I know I am a human being," it clearly makes no sense, under normal circumstances (an important qualifier), to say "I don't know I am a human being."
Or consider the seemingly sensical claim that "I know I am a man." Could I really be mistaken about such a thing!? What would a mistake like this imply? It doesn't even make sense.
79. "That I am a man and not a woman can be verified, but if I were to say I was a woman, and then tried to explain the error by saying I hadn't checked the statement, the explanation would not be accepted."
See, the problem is that claims of knowledge imply that you have evidence and that you need to provide evidence. If I were to say "I know all the capitals of all the countries in the entire world," you would probably want me to demonstrate such a claim. I would do so by reciting the world capitals. Your asking for evidence makes sense and my providing the evidence also makes sense. But, what about the claim that "I know I am a man?" Does it make sense for you to ask for proof? Should I be required to provide such proof? Of course not!
As we discussed before, knowledge implies the possibility of being wrong. That was the problem with the claim that "I know I am in pain." Now, Wittgenstein is also making the point that knowledge requires proof, and in such cases providing proof must make sense. Additionally, the possibility of doubt must be present. This is how the grammar of the word "know" works. It’s much different from being certain.
12. For "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs that guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression "I thought I knew".
Knowing does not guarantee certainty. That's why I can't be said to know those things Moore lists. "6. Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not. For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse, a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed."
Let's turn our attention to the issue of doubt and the foundation for knowledge that is certainty. Remember, that Descartes begins his quest for certainty by doubting all that can be doubted. He attempts to doubt everything. Can this really be done? Wittgenstein says no. One cannot doubt everything. Something must be presupposed to be certain for doubt to make any sense. As Wittgenstein puts it "if I want the door to turn the hinges must stay put."
It's not only that doubt presupposes certainty (OC 115). Some things cannot even be doubted. I made the point in discussing Descartes, that he doubted the existence of his own body. Why? Because knowledge of the body comes from sense experience and he was questioning sense experience. At the time, this may have struck you as odd. Rightly so! Can we really doubt we have a body? Or, more specifically, could you doubt you had two hands? Wittgenstein seems to be saying no. Something as fundamental as having two hands cannot be doubted and even if it could you wouldn't be able to assuage the doubt. This is what Wittgenstein means when he says:
250. "My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as anything that I could produce in evidence for it. That is why I am not in a position to take the sight of my hand as evidence for it."
As he puts it elsewhere, the "reasonable man does not have certain doubts." (OC 220) There are certain things that we simply don't doubt. It's part of who we are and how we live our lives. Other people may have such doubts. We don't. As we'll see in a moment, this constitutes an important part of the foundation for our knowledge of Wittgenstein's philosophy.
Like Descartes, Wittgenstein was looking for a foundation for our knowledge. But, the foundation is very different. Descartes began with doubt which then led to knowledge we could be certain about. Wittgenstein reverses this relationship. We first begin with certainty and this is the context in which knowledge and doubting exist. We have to learn that some things are doubted but this comes later. Actually, the process begins with belief. "The schoolboy believes his teachers and his schoolbooks" (OC 263). "The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes after belief (OC 160). We need a context into which knowledge and doubt arise. This context is what Wittgenstein refers to as a "nest of propositions" about which we are certain. This, of course, must be taught (OC 448).
The interesting question is: What is the nature of this foundation? For Descartes, it was a self-evident proposition: "I think, therefore I am." This doesn't seem quite correct to Wittgenstein.
204. "Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game."
Yes, we need a foundation and an end to our questioning. But the end is not like the questioning or the knowledge we gain from the questioning. It is qualitatively different. "At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded." (OC 253) Notice, he does not say that the foundation is not a "well-founded belief." It is not founded at all! This may cause you to think that there is no justification for our certainty; there is no foundation. However, the reality is that the foundation is the context in which we make judgments about true and false. But the context itself is neither true nor false: "If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false." (OC 205)
The "ground" or foundation is our way of acting. He points this out in sections 110 and 204. "It is our acting which lies at the bottom of the language-game." And this acting is "ungrounded."
Perhaps we can dramatically illustrate this with an example. Stand up. No, I'm serious I want you to stand up for a moment and then sit back down. OK, now why didn't you check to see whether you had two feet before you stood up? I'm sure you didn't, but why didn't you? Wittgenstein's answer in section 148 is very telling. "There is no why. I simply don't. This is how I act." And that's all there is to it!
This is a radically different approach to epistemology than we have seen before. The skepticism that has plagued us can be solved if we separate knowledge and certainty. They are different categories and seeing this allows us to avoid the strange implications of empiricism which demands direct sense experience for everything. The absence of this sense of experience means the absence of knowledge. In confronting this, Wittgenstein points out that the basis for our knowledge is not more knowledge. It’s something qualitatively different. This is not merely a semantic point. It drastically reorders our cognitive categories and begins to address the connection between the faculties of belief, knowledge, doubt, and certainty. Further work has proceeded on these issues but the foundation, so to speak, was laid by Wittgenstein's important work in On Certainty. One question which fascinated Wittgenstein, in particular, was religious belief. He once said to a friend "I am not a religious man: but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view." It is to philosophy of religion that we now turn.