The Problem of Evil
The problem of evil is, perhaps, the most serious challenge leveled against the religious believer. While it does not constitute a "proof" of atheism, it does call into question the nature of God as most theists understand him. Simply put, the problem of evil asks how we can justify the existence of God, and belief in God, with all the evil there is in the world. In philosophical terms the problem arises for those who accept the following three propositions:
1. God is Omnipotent.
2. God is Omni-benevolent.
3. Evil exists.
It may not be obvious why accepting these three propositions entails a problem and so we should clarify what each one implies. In doing this, and outlining the possible solutions to the problem I will be following the lead of a philosopher named J. L. Mackie, who in 1971 published an important article on the subject titled "Evil and Omnipotence."
Proposition one, at the very least, entails that God can eliminate evil. While there are things that an omnipotent being is incapable of, such as violating the laws of logic, it doesn't seem to be too much of a leap to suppose that God could eliminate evil. Proposition two, at the very least, seems to entail that God is inclined to eliminate evil. This should clarify the problem at hand. If God is both capable of and inclined to eliminate evil, there should be no evil. But evil does exist which demands an explanation. In clarifying proposition three many philosophers make a distinction between natural and moral evil. Natural evil includes such things as floods, earthquakes, famines, pain, and disease. They are naturally occurring things that have negative effects on human beings. Moral evil includes actions caused by human beings which have negative effects on other human beings. This would include such acts as murder, rape, genocide, and torture. Some philosophers have suggested that we only deal with moral evils since naturally occurring things, such as floods and earthquakes, are not inherently evil. They are only interpreted as evil if human beings happen to be affected. Still, we are left with the problem of explaining moral evil. We will consider various solutions to the problem which are called "theodicies." Theodicy is from the Latin for justification since we are, in essence, trying to justify God's existence in the face of evil.
Mackie points out that three perfectly adequate solutions completely solve the problem. The trouble with these solutions is that they create problems much greater than the ones we're solving and so are usually not accepted. Before explaining these solutions I should point out that the problem of evil only exists for those who believe all three of the propositions stated above. If you do not believe one of them then there is no problem. Any two can be logically coherent. It is only the combination of all three that seems to entail a logical contradiction.
One solution is to deny the truth of proposition one. If God is not omnipotent then he may simply be unable to eliminate evil. This solution was suggested by the 19th century English philosopher, John Stuart Mill. You can see how it perfectly solves the problem. Evil exists, at least in part, because of God's inability to eliminate it. You can probably also see why many religious believers reject it.
A second solution is to deny the truth of proposition two. Perhaps God is not Omni-benevolent; that is to say, perhaps God is partially evil. This solution was offered by our old friend, David Hume. According to Hume, if you were going to infer the existence of God based on the existence of the universe you would have to infer that God is partially evil. After all, the effect of God's work is partially evil. A variant of this solution goes back to early Christianity. In the first and second centuries of Christianity, there was a sect called the Gnostics who believed that the universe was created by an evil god. It was only later that a second, good, God sent Christ to redeem the world. Needless to say, many Christians then, as of now, deny the validity of this solution.
A third possible adequate solution is to deny the existence of evil. This may sound like a very strange thing to say or do. How can we deny that evil exists? Well, according to some philosophers, such as St Augustine, evil is not a thing at all. The problem of evil arises from thinking of it as such. What is evil then? Evil is the absence of something; that is, evil is a privation. The very nature of created things is to be imperfect. Since the universe was created by God, it follows that it is imperfect. That is, it lacks something it should have. But this "lack" is not a thing to be contended with. It is the absence of goodness that's the problem. Is this just a question of semantics? Perhaps. While it may solve the logical problem of evil to say that disease is just the absence of health, it probably doesn't make the sick person feel any better. We should probably consider other possible solutions to the problem.
In his article "Evil and Omnipotence," Mackie proceeds to outline several enticing solutions that may seem to work but have logical problems. These are different from the solutions considered above because those didn't have logical problems, though they did have reasons for not accepting them. I will address four of these so-called "inadequate solutions.
1. Evil is a contrast to good. This solution proceeds by pointing out that we could not know what good was without comparing it with something not good, that is, evil. We need evil to contrast with good. For example, if everything in the universe were colored blue, we wouldn't know what blue was. Therefore, we need some red to give us a contrast. But there is a problem with this solution. For the purposes of contrast just how much red do we need? Very little. So, with regard to evil as a contrast to good, we should only have very little evil. But it seems that we have a lot of evil in the world; much more than is needed for a simple contrast. So this solution does not seem to explain why there is so much evil in the world.
2. Evil is a necessary cause to good. This solution can be dismissed fairly easily since it represents a severe restriction on God's omnipotence. If good cannot arise at all but for evil then in what sense can God be called all-powerful? Perhaps to make this work it needs to be modified as follows:
3. The world is better with evil than without. What this solution postulates is that evil may give rise to a higher good, not as a matter of necessity but as the best means only. In showing how this might work we can combine it with the first solution of evil as a contrast. So consider that pleasure and pain are contrasting good and evil; we'll call them first-order good and first-order evil. We do not need to say that one explains the other but we do need to address why there is pain. What we might say is that pain is the best way to give rise to a higher good. If such a higher good exists, and if the evil of pain can give rise to it, then clearly, the universe is better off than it would be without the higher good. So what possible higher good could arise from pain? Well, perhaps compassion or sympathy.
Let's call these second-order goods. But, if there are second-order goods it seems likely that there are second-order evils as well. One example of such evil might be cruelty. To explain this second-order evil we need to appeal, again, to a higher order good; a third order good. Let's call this justice. Of course, now you see the problem. Every higher-order goodwill implies a higher-order evil to contrast and then that evil will need to be explained by an even higher good. The explanation will always be inadequate because it will never fully explain the existence of evil.
4. One of the most popular solutions is called the free-will defense. Evil is the result of free choices made by human beings. God gave us the ability to do that which is good but this also implies that we can do evil. It is our choice and sometimes we choose evil. As the argument goes God had two alternatives when he created us. 1. God could have created us without free will and thus we would always do that which is good. 2. God could have created us with free will which entails the possibility of evil. Option two is the better one and so that explains evil.
Mackie's response to this solution is clever if not completely convincing. Still, it’s worth considering. Freewill doesn't imply random action any more than it precludes doing the same thing every time. For example, if I order the same dish every time I go to a certain restaurant that doesn't imply that I have no free will. It just implies that I'm always freely choosing the same option. With this in mind, Mackie suggests that God could have created us such that we always freely choose to do the good. This would solve the problem of evil and it also shows the inadequacy of the freewill defense. Needless to say, many people find his reasoning inadequate! Still, the logic of the problem of evil seems troubling.
Perhaps the problem is in using logic to solve it. Perhaps evil is irrational. This was the approach offered by Albert Camus. In a work titled The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus considered the absurdity of existence and how to live in the face of that absurdity. Part of the problem is in our very attempt to give evil, and life for that matter, a meaning. There is no meaning but we still must face the question of whether to live or not. This Camus calls the "fundamental question of philosophy." We have two options when confronting it and evil. We can give in: suicide. We can turn and face it: conscious revolt. Camus advocates the latter and uses the image of Sisyphus, who was condemned for all eternity to roll a rock up a hill only to have it roll back down and start over, to convey this response. While many see Camus' answer as pessimistic, he saw it as optimism. As he points out "one supposes that Sisyphus was happy." We too can be happy if we realize the irrationality of evil and the absurdity of existence.
One last approach may provide a little more comfort though. Perhaps evil is therapy. This may sound as strange as anything I've said so far but stay with me. If you remember a few chapters ago I mentioned Viktor Frankl and his logotherapy which was an attempt to give meaning to life. This is a much different approach to Camus. Consider an animal being used for medical research. The animal is subjected to painful experiments. From the perspective of that animal, the pain and suffering are meaningless. If the animal could see things from the human perspective it would understand the true meaning of its suffering. How do we know that there isn't a higher realm where our suffering too has a meaning? Perhaps, our suffering here is meant to prepare us for something to come. One of the best examples of this theodicy is given by Malcolm Muggeridge; a twentieth-century journalist and eloquent spokesman for Christianity. He relates the following parable:
"Some very humane, rather simpleminded old lady sees the play King Lear performed and she is outraged that a poor old man should be so humiliated, made to suffer so. And in the eternal shade, she meets Shakespeare, and she says to him, 'What a monstrous thing to make that poor old man go through all that.' And Shakespeare says, 'Yes, I quite agree. It was very painful, and I could have arranged for him to take a sedative at the end of Act I, but then ma'am, there would have been no play.' See my point?"
1. God is Omnipotent.
2. God is Omni-benevolent.
3. Evil exists.
It may not be obvious why accepting these three propositions entails a problem and so we should clarify what each one implies. In doing this, and outlining the possible solutions to the problem I will be following the lead of a philosopher named J. L. Mackie, who in 1971 published an important article on the subject titled "Evil and Omnipotence."
Proposition one, at the very least, entails that God can eliminate evil. While there are things that an omnipotent being is incapable of, such as violating the laws of logic, it doesn't seem to be too much of a leap to suppose that God could eliminate evil. Proposition two, at the very least, seems to entail that God is inclined to eliminate evil. This should clarify the problem at hand. If God is both capable of and inclined to eliminate evil, there should be no evil. But evil does exist which demands an explanation. In clarifying proposition three many philosophers make a distinction between natural and moral evil. Natural evil includes such things as floods, earthquakes, famines, pain, and disease. They are naturally occurring things that have negative effects on human beings. Moral evil includes actions caused by human beings which have negative effects on other human beings. This would include such acts as murder, rape, genocide, and torture. Some philosophers have suggested that we only deal with moral evils since naturally occurring things, such as floods and earthquakes, are not inherently evil. They are only interpreted as evil if human beings happen to be affected. Still, we are left with the problem of explaining moral evil. We will consider various solutions to the problem which are called "theodicies." Theodicy is from the Latin for justification since we are, in essence, trying to justify God's existence in the face of evil.
Mackie points out that three perfectly adequate solutions completely solve the problem. The trouble with these solutions is that they create problems much greater than the ones we're solving and so are usually not accepted. Before explaining these solutions I should point out that the problem of evil only exists for those who believe all three of the propositions stated above. If you do not believe one of them then there is no problem. Any two can be logically coherent. It is only the combination of all three that seems to entail a logical contradiction.
One solution is to deny the truth of proposition one. If God is not omnipotent then he may simply be unable to eliminate evil. This solution was suggested by the 19th century English philosopher, John Stuart Mill. You can see how it perfectly solves the problem. Evil exists, at least in part, because of God's inability to eliminate it. You can probably also see why many religious believers reject it.
A second solution is to deny the truth of proposition two. Perhaps God is not Omni-benevolent; that is to say, perhaps God is partially evil. This solution was offered by our old friend, David Hume. According to Hume, if you were going to infer the existence of God based on the existence of the universe you would have to infer that God is partially evil. After all, the effect of God's work is partially evil. A variant of this solution goes back to early Christianity. In the first and second centuries of Christianity, there was a sect called the Gnostics who believed that the universe was created by an evil god. It was only later that a second, good, God sent Christ to redeem the world. Needless to say, many Christians then, as of now, deny the validity of this solution.
A third possible adequate solution is to deny the existence of evil. This may sound like a very strange thing to say or do. How can we deny that evil exists? Well, according to some philosophers, such as St Augustine, evil is not a thing at all. The problem of evil arises from thinking of it as such. What is evil then? Evil is the absence of something; that is, evil is a privation. The very nature of created things is to be imperfect. Since the universe was created by God, it follows that it is imperfect. That is, it lacks something it should have. But this "lack" is not a thing to be contended with. It is the absence of goodness that's the problem. Is this just a question of semantics? Perhaps. While it may solve the logical problem of evil to say that disease is just the absence of health, it probably doesn't make the sick person feel any better. We should probably consider other possible solutions to the problem.
In his article "Evil and Omnipotence," Mackie proceeds to outline several enticing solutions that may seem to work but have logical problems. These are different from the solutions considered above because those didn't have logical problems, though they did have reasons for not accepting them. I will address four of these so-called "inadequate solutions.
1. Evil is a contrast to good. This solution proceeds by pointing out that we could not know what good was without comparing it with something not good, that is, evil. We need evil to contrast with good. For example, if everything in the universe were colored blue, we wouldn't know what blue was. Therefore, we need some red to give us a contrast. But there is a problem with this solution. For the purposes of contrast just how much red do we need? Very little. So, with regard to evil as a contrast to good, we should only have very little evil. But it seems that we have a lot of evil in the world; much more than is needed for a simple contrast. So this solution does not seem to explain why there is so much evil in the world.
2. Evil is a necessary cause to good. This solution can be dismissed fairly easily since it represents a severe restriction on God's omnipotence. If good cannot arise at all but for evil then in what sense can God be called all-powerful? Perhaps to make this work it needs to be modified as follows:
3. The world is better with evil than without. What this solution postulates is that evil may give rise to a higher good, not as a matter of necessity but as the best means only. In showing how this might work we can combine it with the first solution of evil as a contrast. So consider that pleasure and pain are contrasting good and evil; we'll call them first-order good and first-order evil. We do not need to say that one explains the other but we do need to address why there is pain. What we might say is that pain is the best way to give rise to a higher good. If such a higher good exists, and if the evil of pain can give rise to it, then clearly, the universe is better off than it would be without the higher good. So what possible higher good could arise from pain? Well, perhaps compassion or sympathy.
Let's call these second-order goods. But, if there are second-order goods it seems likely that there are second-order evils as well. One example of such evil might be cruelty. To explain this second-order evil we need to appeal, again, to a higher order good; a third order good. Let's call this justice. Of course, now you see the problem. Every higher-order goodwill implies a higher-order evil to contrast and then that evil will need to be explained by an even higher good. The explanation will always be inadequate because it will never fully explain the existence of evil.
4. One of the most popular solutions is called the free-will defense. Evil is the result of free choices made by human beings. God gave us the ability to do that which is good but this also implies that we can do evil. It is our choice and sometimes we choose evil. As the argument goes God had two alternatives when he created us. 1. God could have created us without free will and thus we would always do that which is good. 2. God could have created us with free will which entails the possibility of evil. Option two is the better one and so that explains evil.
Mackie's response to this solution is clever if not completely convincing. Still, it’s worth considering. Freewill doesn't imply random action any more than it precludes doing the same thing every time. For example, if I order the same dish every time I go to a certain restaurant that doesn't imply that I have no free will. It just implies that I'm always freely choosing the same option. With this in mind, Mackie suggests that God could have created us such that we always freely choose to do the good. This would solve the problem of evil and it also shows the inadequacy of the freewill defense. Needless to say, many people find his reasoning inadequate! Still, the logic of the problem of evil seems troubling.
Perhaps the problem is in using logic to solve it. Perhaps evil is irrational. This was the approach offered by Albert Camus. In a work titled The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus considered the absurdity of existence and how to live in the face of that absurdity. Part of the problem is in our very attempt to give evil, and life for that matter, a meaning. There is no meaning but we still must face the question of whether to live or not. This Camus calls the "fundamental question of philosophy." We have two options when confronting it and evil. We can give in: suicide. We can turn and face it: conscious revolt. Camus advocates the latter and uses the image of Sisyphus, who was condemned for all eternity to roll a rock up a hill only to have it roll back down and start over, to convey this response. While many see Camus' answer as pessimistic, he saw it as optimism. As he points out "one supposes that Sisyphus was happy." We too can be happy if we realize the irrationality of evil and the absurdity of existence.
One last approach may provide a little more comfort though. Perhaps evil is therapy. This may sound as strange as anything I've said so far but stay with me. If you remember a few chapters ago I mentioned Viktor Frankl and his logotherapy which was an attempt to give meaning to life. This is a much different approach to Camus. Consider an animal being used for medical research. The animal is subjected to painful experiments. From the perspective of that animal, the pain and suffering are meaningless. If the animal could see things from the human perspective it would understand the true meaning of its suffering. How do we know that there isn't a higher realm where our suffering too has a meaning? Perhaps, our suffering here is meant to prepare us for something to come. One of the best examples of this theodicy is given by Malcolm Muggeridge; a twentieth-century journalist and eloquent spokesman for Christianity. He relates the following parable:
"Some very humane, rather simpleminded old lady sees the play King Lear performed and she is outraged that a poor old man should be so humiliated, made to suffer so. And in the eternal shade, she meets Shakespeare, and she says to him, 'What a monstrous thing to make that poor old man go through all that.' And Shakespeare says, 'Yes, I quite agree. It was very painful, and I could have arranged for him to take a sedative at the end of Act I, but then ma'am, there would have been no play.' See my point?"